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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OP UTAH

SALT LAKE COUNTY, a body
politic,
Petitioner,
Case No. 141^2
vs.
TAX COMMISSION OF THE STATE
OF UTAH, ex rel, GOOD
SHEPHERD LUTHERAN CHURCH,
Respondents.

BRIEF OF PETITIONER

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
This Is an original action in certiorari to review
certain proceedings, orders and decisions of the Tax Commission
of the State of Utah wherein certain properties located in Salt
Lake County and assessed by said county for the year 1972 were
subsequently exempted by the State Tax Commission of Utah.
DISPOSITION BY TAX COMMISSION
Petitioner filed a petition for formal hearing with
the State Tax Commission which hearing resulted in a decision by
the Commission whereby the decision of the County Board of Equaliaztion was reversed and set aside and the subject property was
exempted from ad valorem taxes for the year 1972.
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Petitioner seeks review and reversal of the decision
of the Tax Commission and the whole thereof, and that the case be
remanded back to the Tax Commission of the State of Utah directing
said administrative agency to make and enter its decision that the
said residence owned by Good Shepherd Lutheran Church and used by
its pastor is not being used exclusively for religious worship as
that term is defined by Article XIII Section 2 of the Constitution
of Utah* and Section 59-2-1, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, and that
the Assessor of Salt Lake County be directed to enter the same on
the rolls of Salt Lake County, and that the same be taxed for the
year 1972 and subsequent years without any exceptions. Further,
petitioner seeks a determination by this Court that Sections
59-2-30 and 59-2-31, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended, are
unconstitutional and, therefore, null and void.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
References to the transcript of proceedings are
designated "T" with the page number following.
Petitioner Salt Lake County is a legal and political
subdivision of the State of Utah.
The Tax Commission of the State of Utah is an
administrative body existing by virtue of the laws of the State
of Utah.
••.,/—. Petitioner derives a substantial portion of its
revenue from the assessment, levy and collection of ad valorem
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taxes upon all taxable property located within Salt Lake County.
The tax herein involved is the ad valorem property tax assessed
by Salt Lake County for the year 1972 against certain improved
property located at 1376 East 8850 South, Sandy, Utah, Salt Lake
County. Tax Serial No. 34-0494-015.
Application for exemption for the year 1972 was made by
the property owner to the Salt Lake County Board of Equalization
and exemption was denied.

An appeal was made to the Tax Commission

of Utah. (T-l)
Applciation was again made to the County Board of
Equalization for the year 1973.

The 1973 application for exemption

was again denied by Salt Lake County. (T-15)
On November 19, 19735 the Tax Commission issued its
written decision with regard to 1973 taxes and thereby reversed the
Salt Lake County Board of Equalization and granted the exemption.
(T-12)
Thereafter, in 1974 notice was sent to the property
owner with regard to the appeal for 19 72 to ascertain whether or
not any differences existed with regard to the use of the property
for the year 1973 and the year 1972.
A formal hearing was held on May 9, 19 75 before the
Tax Commission (T-17)
The evidence presented at the hearing established
that the property in question consisted of:

a two-story residence

with an attached garage built in 1961. The home is half aluminum
siding and half block exterior walls.

It contains 1750 square
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feet of living area with a half basement and 1 1/2 baths.
The property is well landscaped and the home has forced air gas
heat and in excellent condition.

The assessed value was $3,950,

market value was $19>750. (T-l8)

There are 4 bedrooms and a

full bath upstairs and a half bath downstairs.

It has a living

room and a kitchen area big enough to include a dining area*
(T-26)

The basement Is unfinished containing the furnace, washer

and dryer and storage area.
The pastor, his wife and three children occupy the
bedrooms.

There is no office in the home* (T-27)

A limited or

occasional number of meetings are held in the living room of the
home. (T-l8, 25) However, the church facility served by the pastor
which is located about one and one-half miles from the residence
here in question contains an office, conference room and classrooms
for religious instructions for youth and adults.

(T-25, 27) The

pastor does receive telephone calls at home.
The home is owned by the Good Shepherd Lutheran Church
and is furnished to the pastor as part of his overall compensation.
Except for the fact that the home is occupied and lived in by a
minister of the church, the home would probably not be distinguishable from any other home in the neighborhood. (T-28)
On May 14, 1975, the Tax Commission issued its decision
and found that the property was exempt under Article XIII Section 2
of the Constitution of the State of Utah and in accordance with the
provisions of Sections 59-2-30 and 59-2-313 Utah Code Annotated,
1953, as amended, further determining that said property is used
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for religious worship or charitable purposes which are incidental
to and reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of such
religious worship or charitable purposes.

(T-19)

On the 13th day of June, 1975, Petitioner, Salt Lake
County, filed a Petition for Writ of Review asserting that the
property in question was not used in such a manner as to entitle
it to exemption within the meaning of Article XIII Section 2 of
the Constitution of the State of Utah.

Further, that the provi-

sions of Section 59-2-30 and Section 59-2-31, Utah Code Annotated,
1953* as amended, as interpreted and applied by the Tax Commission
were inconsistent with the Constitution of Utah, Article XIII
Section 2.

That the decision of the Tax Commission was arbitrary

and capricious, not supported by the evidence, and, therefore,
without basis in law or fact.

The petition further seeks the

reversal or setting aside of the decision of the Tax Commission.
Based upon the Petition for Writ of Review, this Court on the 13th
day of June, 1975, issued its Writ of Review to the Tax Commission
directing said Commission to certify the record to this Court and
give notice of the pendency of the Writ to all interested parties.
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ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE RESIDENCE OWNED BY GOOD SHEPHERD LUTHERAN CHURCH WAS NOT
USED EXCLUSIVELY FOR RELIGIOUS WORSHIP TO QUALIFY IT FOR
EXEMPTION FROM TAXATION UNDER AND BY VIRTUE OF ARTICLE XIII
OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE STATE OF UTAH AND SECTION 59-2-1,
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED, 1953.
The question to be resolved in this case is whether
the home, used as a residence for the pastor of Good Shepherd
Lutheran Church and his family, has been used exclusively for
"religious worship" as shown by the facts adduced in this
case under and by virtue of Article XIII Section 2 of the
Constitution of the State of Utah and Section 59-2-1, Utah Code
Annotated, 1953, as amended.
The material part of the Constitution of the State
of Utah pertinent to the issue before this Honorable Court is
Article XIII Section 2 which provides as follows:
"All tangible property in the state,
not exempt under the laws of the United
States, or under this constitution, shall
be taxed in proportion to its value,
to be ascertained as provided by law.
The property of the state, counties,
cities, towns, school districts, municipal corporations and public libraries,
lots with the buildings thereon used
exclusively for either religious worship
or charitable purposes/ *** shall be
exempt from taxation.***" (Emphasis supplied)
Section 59-2-1, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, provides as
follows:
"The property of the United States, of
this state, counties, cities, towns,
school districts, municipal corporations
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and public libraries* lots with the
buildings thereon used exclusively for
either religious worship or charitable
purposes1,'*'*"*" shall be exempt from
taxation," (Emphasis supplied)
The instant case is one of first impression for this
Honorable Court.

Petitioner is not aware of any cases decided

by the Court in its 78-year history since statehood involving
an interpretation of the property tax exemption extended to
property used exclusively for religious worship under Article
XIII Section 2 of the Constitution of Utah.

There is some

discussion of this language by Justice Crockett in his concurring
opinion in B.P.O.E. No, 85 v. TAX COMMISSION, 536 P.2d 1214 (1975),
There have, however, been numerous cases decided by this Court
in the interpretation of the charitable exemption involved in
the same constitutional provision, and although they do not
involve precisely the same language as is involved in this case,
they do afford guidelines regarding the manner in which this
Court has generally approached the exemption provisions of the
Constitution and statutes.

Petitioner asserts that the owner

has not met the burden required of it to show that the residence
facility should be exempt from taxation and, therefore, an exception to the general rule that all property of whatever kind soever
and by whomsoever owned is subject to taxation.
not be aided by judicial interpretation.
construction applies.
exemption.

An exemption must

The rule of strict

All doubts must be resolved against the

See PARKER v. QUINN, 64 P. 961, 23 Utah 332, wherein

this Court states as follows:
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"..•The general rule is that all
property of what kind soever, and by
whomsoever owned, be subject to taxation; and, when any kind of property is
exempt, it constitutes an exception to
this rule. The reason of the rule is
that it is just and equitable that every
species of property within the state
should bear its equal proportion of the
burdens of government. When, therefore,
an owner claims that certain property is
exempt from taxation? the burden is upon
him to show that it falls within the
exception. And an exception will not
be aided by judicial interpretation....
In such cases, the rule of strict construction applies, and in order to
relieve any species of property from its
dueand just proportion of the burdens
of the government, the language relied
on as creating the exemption should be
so clear as not to admit of reasonable
controversy about is meaning; for all
doubts must be resolved against the exemption. The power to tax rests upon
necessity, and is essential to the existence of the state." (Emphasis supplied)

.-."••

"...The exemptions thus expressly granted
as we have seen form an exception to the
general rule that every species of property
within the state is liable to bear its
just proportion of the public burden. Any
property falling within the exception is
released from this burden, and such release
is justified on the theory^ that the state
derives some peculiar benefit—-whatever that
may be--from such property...." (Emphasis ours)
The applicant in the instant case did not introduce
any facts whatever to show that the residence of the pastor
was in any way substantially different from the thousands of
individual residences owned by the various individual taxpayers
in the county.

The use is precisely the same.

It is a two-

story residence with an attached garage built on the subject
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property in 1961.

The home is half aluminum siding and half

block exterior walls.

It contains 1750 square feet of living

area with a half basement and 1 1/2 baths.

The property is

well landscaped and the home has forced air gas hear and is in
excellent condition*

The upstairs is four bedrooms and that is

the extent of the bedrooms and the full bath upstairs and a half
bath downstairs,"

"...It has a living room and a kitchen area

that is big enough to include a dining area as part of it."
(T-25-26)
The basement is unfinished, containing a furnace,
washer and dryer and storage for tools and other similar items.
The pastor, his wife and their children (4) (of which 3 are home)
occupy the bedrooms.

There is no office in the home, (T-27)

although some meetings and Bible study classes have been conducted
in the living room. (T-27) Except for the fact that the home is
occupied by a minister, the home would not be distinguishable
from any other home in the neighborhood. (T-28).

The fair market

value for the year 1972 would exceed $19,750.00. (T-26)
This property is used as a residential dwelling.

The

Constitution of Utah exempts property used exclusively for
religious worship not property used exclusively as a residence.
To grant an exemption to property used "exclusively as a residence"
would amount to an absolute perversion of the plain meaning of
our constitution.

It would also open the door to great abuse.

Certainly the fact that the property is owned by an
ecclesiastical organization cannot be the basis for such an
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exemption.

The religious worship exemption is granted by

virtue of use, not ownership.
tion.

The use gives rise to the exemp-

In ODD FELLOWS1 BUILDING ASS'N v. NAYLOR,

177 P. 214,

53 Utah 111 (1918), this Court answered the question of ownership
as affecting use exemptions wherein it indicated that it must
be conceded that the owners of the property, to be exempt within
the purview of the Constitution, are not limited to ecclesiastical
or charitable organizations, but the exemption privileges extended
to the class of property mentioned, without regard to the character
of its owner.

The owner may be a church organization, a charitable

or fraternal organization or It may be a private individual or
corporation.

It is, therefore, the use of the property that

determines its taxable status.
In the case of FRIENDSHIP MANOR CORPORATION v. TAX
COMMISSION, 487 P2d 1272, 26 Utah 2d 227 (1971), this Court again
had occasion to examine the charitable use exemption of the Utah
Constitution.

In that case, the property owner was organized

as a Utah non-profit corporation.

The organization undertook to

construct a housing project for elderly persons which was also
sponsored by four religious organizations.

The organization had

been determined to be a charitable organization for purposes of
federal taxation under Sections 501(c) (3) of the Internal Revenue
Code.

A 228-unit facility was constructed in Salt Lake which

was rented out to certain tenants meeting specified requirements
including (1) that the tenants must be ambulatory; (2) they must
be financially able to maintain or pay the rent, as well as take
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care of themselves.

No persons were accepted who were not

financially responsible to pay the expenses or maintain the standard
of living required by the manor and, in general, tenants were
required to be 62 years of age or older, except FHA regulations
did allow 20$ of the total number of apartments to be rented
to persons under 62. The defendant's position in the case was
basically that the property could not be used exclusively for
charitable purposes when the tenants are required to pay for
all of the facilities and services they receive and that the
only charity involved is that the tenants pay less rent because
of the property tax exemption.

The Court held the manor to be

taxable and reversed the decision of the trial court.

In reaching

its decision, the Court made several significant statements. At
page 1276, the Court indicated
"it is the use to which it puts its
real property which is the determination
of whether or not such property is exempt.
If the charitable organization does not
use its real property and building thereon
exclusively for charitable purposes, such
property is not exempt, notwithstanding the
fact that the owner thereof is a charitable
organization,rt
The Court further indicated that
"the fact that plaintiff is exempt from
federal taxation under the provisions of
the Internal Revenue Code is not determinative, although the non-profit aspect would
be a necessary ingredient of a qualifying,
charitable operation." at page 1277
The Court thereupon

restated the general rule regarding property

tax exemptions and at page 1280 stated
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"The general rule is then that all property
is taxed unless exempt, and to be exempt,
the burden is upon the property owner to
show it falls within the exemption.
!

The power to tax rests upon necessity
and is essential to the existence of the
s u a T/ e « • • •

The u s e o f t h e p r o p e r t y is t h e n t h e b a s i s u p o n w h i c h an e x e m p t i o n

can be granted, not the mere ownership.
The extent of property tax exemptions for religious
property has been the subject of great debates. The privilege
of exemption for religious institutions goes back to antiquity.
The priestly classes in Ancient Greece, Persia, Egypt and India
enjoyed property tax exemptions.

In biblical times, the exemp-

tion was granted to Levites and other functionaries in the Temple
in Jerusalem.

In the 4th Century, Emperor Constantine, a convert

to Christianity, granted tax immunity to the Catholic Church.
The practice of religious exemptions thereafter became a European
tradition, interrupted briefly by Henry the VIII of England and
Napolean Boneparte.

These traditions were brought to America

with the first colonists and have found their way into most state
constitutions and, where not conferred by state constitution, the
exemption has resulted from judicial decisions and statutes.

See

A REPORT ON CHURCHES AND TAXATION, Guild of St. Ives, May 1967 p 1;
Also Van Alstyne, TAX EXEMPTION OF CHURCH PROPERTY, 20 Ohio State
Law Journal, 461-62 (1959); also, CONSTITUTIONALITY OF RELIGIOUS
TAX BENEFITS, 49 Columbia Law Review 968092 (1949); Time Magazine,
15 May, 1964, p 53.
Each state has its own separate constitution and
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exemption standard, but It is almost universally agreed that
language such as that found in Article XIII Section 2 of the Utah
Constitution creates a very narrow exemption.

The principle

of strict construction of tax exemption statutes is applied with
greater frequency to statutes exempting property used exclusively
for "religious worship" or for "public worship" than those
exempting property "used exclusively for religious purposes",
with the result that residential or recreational facilities of
religious organizations are less likely to be granted exemption
within the former than within the latter.

See 15 ALR 2d 1068

note 4.
In PEOPLE ex rel. THOMPSON vs. FIRST CONGREGATIONAL
CHURCH OF OAK PARK, 232 111. 158, 83 N.E. 536 (1908), the Illinois
Supreme Court was asked to interpret a fact situation almost
identical to the one in the instant case.

In that case, the property

in question was improved by a 10-room, two-story frame house and
a barn.

The lot and buildings were of ordinary size used for

residential purposes in Oak Park.

The property was not used for

pecuniary profit, and no rent or revenue of any kind was derived.
The premises were used by the pastor of the said church and his
immediate family as a residence, and the pastor devoted his whole
time to the work of his church*

The Illinois Constitution granted

exemption to property used exclusively for religious purposes.
A much broader standard than that of the Utah Constitution.

The

legislature had passed a statute exempting all church property
used exclusively for public worship and further granted exemption
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to parsonages or residences actually used by persons devoting
their entire time to church work.

The Illinois Supreme Court

denied the exemption and held the statute to be unconstitutional.
That court made the following significant statements in its
decision:
"The parsonage in this case was used as a
home for the pastor and the members of his
immediate family. So far as appears from
this recordv it was used as afamily
residence3 and nothing more. As suggested
in the Kansas case referred to below, there
seems to be no ground upon which i t c a n b e
contended that it was used for a religious
purpose any more than was the residence of
any other Christian gentleman who was a
member of the same churchi 83 N.'EY at
page 538.
The court went on to say:
"Upon reason, the conclusion that the property
involved in this suit is used primarily
for a secular or temporal purpose and not
exclusively for religious purposes within the
meaning of our constitution seems irresistable."
The court then compared the language of the constitution
and the statute involved and distinguished between the language
"public worship" and religious purposes and made the following
observation:
" 'public worship' is less comprehensive
than the language of our constitution1."
(Emphasis supplied)
In the case before this Court, there are no facts of
record to indicate any use other than primarily as a residence.
Even those states with broader exemption provisions than those
found in our Constitution would deny the exemption presently before
the Court.

In VAIL v. BEACH, 10 Kan. 214, the court was asked
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to exempt a parsonage occupied by the pastor of the church.
The Kansas court determined that the property was used the same
as any other dwelling, and as such was not distinguishable
from the use of the dwelling occupied by any other member of the
same church, and that it was clearly not the purpose of the
constitution to relieve such property from taxation.

In COUNTY

OF RAMSEY v. CHURCH OF GOOD SHEPHERD, 45 Minn, 229, ^1 N.W. 783,
it was said that a parsonage occupied by the pastor as a residence
was used for a secular and not a religious purpose.

In FIRST

CONGREGATIONAL CHURCH OF DeKALB v. BOARD OF REVIEW OF DeKALB ,
COUNTY, 254 111. 220, 98 N.E. 275 (1912), the Illinois court was
again asked to ascertain the exempt status of a ministerfs
residence.

Again, that court denied the exemption.

the court drew the distinction

In doing so,

between a place of worship and

•a residence.
"We think it obvious, therefore, that all
would understand and readily concede that
a church is a building which in its primary
sense is used for a religious purpose;
that is, such use is its principal and
general use, and that its occasional use
as a lecture room or for other similar use
would not destroy the exemption. On the
contrary, we think it is equally well understood by all as the very name signifies,
that the primary use of a parsonage is a
home for the pastor and his family; that is,
that such use Is its principal and general use,
and that the fact that some parts of the
parsonage are used for purposes connected with
the pastor's work or the work of the church
would not make it a building used exclusively
for religious purposes and exempt it from
taxation." at page 276
Further, the court stated:
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"...the primary purpose for which the
parsonage in question was acquired and possessed
by the appellant is not religious, but is
secular, and that it is not exempt from taxation...."
"There is, however, no evidence found in this
record which shows that the primary use of
the parsonage in this is other than a home
provided by the church for the pastor and his
• family." 98 N.E. at page 277
There is no evidence in the case before this Court,.
nor of record before the Tax Commission that would establish the
residence of the pastor of Good Shepherd Lutheran Church to be
used exclusively for religious worship.

To the contrary, the

facts and testimony before the Commission as regards the use of
the home, is that it is used as a residence.

Under these factual

circumstances, there is no basis upon which an exemption can be
granted.

Nor should the Court be influenced by the profession

of the occupant.

"...The fact that a parsonage is used by a

minister who devotes himself entirely to the services of God and
to works of religion and charity, whereby the interests of his
church are subserved, does not convert the parsonage from a
secular into a religious use."

98 N.E. 275 at page 277

In a comprehensive review of state exemption provisions
and authorities, Professor Arvo Van Alstyne made the following
observation:
"The exact terminology of the exemption
law, of course, is the most significant
factor to be considered. Thus religious
'worship' being demonstrably narrower than
religious 'purposes1,"
SIERRA RETREAT v. COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES, 35 Cal. 2d 775, 221
P.2d 59 (1950); PEOPLE v. LOGAN SQUARE PRESBYTERIAN CHURCH, 2^9 111.
9, 94 N.E. 155 (1911); TRUSTEES OF GRISWOLD COLLEGE v. STATE OF
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IOWA, 46 Iowa 706 (1877), ministerial residences have usually
been denied exemption where exclusive use for religious "worship"
is the test, ST. MARK'S CHURCH v. CITY OF BRUNSWICK, 78 Ga. 54l,
35 S.E. 561 (1887); TRUSTEES OF METHODIST EPISCOPAL CHURCH v.
ELLIS, 38 Ind. 3 (1871); SOCIETY OF PRECIOUS BLOOD v. BOARD OF
TAX APPEALS, 1^9 Ohio St. 67, 77 N.E. 2d 459 (1948); TRINITY
METHODIST EPISCOPAL CHURCH v. SAN ANTONIO, 201 S.W. 669 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1918), WILLIAM T. STEAD MEMORIAL CENTER v. WAREHAM, 299
Mass. 235, 12 N.E. 2d 725 (1938), but have often obtained relief,
modernly at least, under a requirement of exclusive use for
religious "purposes."

See Van Alstyne, 20 Ohio State Law Journal

(1959) p 483.
Petitioner submits that the only conclusion that
can be properly drawn from the facts of this case and the law
that is applicable to the residence in question is that the property is used exclusively for residential purposes and is, therefore, not entitled to exemption under Article XIII Section 2 of
the Constitution of Utah.
POINT II
SECTIONS 59-2-30 and 59-2-31 OF UTAH CODE ANNOTATED, 1953, ARE
NULL AND VOID BECAUSE THEY ARE AN UNCONSTITUTIONAL EXTENSION 0^
THE EXEMPTIONS GRANTED BY THE UTAH CONSTITUTION.
The Constitution of Utah, Article XIII, Section 2,
speaks in terms of "religious worship."

Section 59-2-1, Utah

Code Annotated, 1953 is a rephrasing of the constitutional
provision and uses the standard "religious worship."

In 1972,

the Utah State Legislature passed Sections 59-2-30 and 59-2-31.

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

{

Section 59-2-303 when dealing with the religious exemption,
substitutes the word "purposes" for "worship".

When the Tax

Commission granted the exemption, it did so on the basis of
Sections 59-2-30 and 59-2-31, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended.
(T-19) Petitioner asserts that Sections 59-2-30 and 59-2-31,
Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended, constitute an unconstitutional extension of the religious exemption granted by the Utah
Constitution, Article XIII Section 2, and are in direct conflict
with the Constitution and Section 59-2-1, Utah Code Annotated,
1953, as amended.

The above cited authorities make it unequivocally

clear that the language "religious purposes" is much broader than
"religious worship" and that the substitution of the word "purposes"
for "worship" render statutes 59-2-30 and 59-2-31 unconstitutional
because they grant exemptions from property taxes to classes of
property not included within the constitutional language and,
therefore, beyond the power of the legislature to expand.

This

precise question has already been decided bv this Honorable Court.
In STATE v; ARMSTRONG, 53 P. 9 8l (1898), this Court
had occasion to review the legal ability of the legislature to
expand exemptions beyond constitutional limitations.

That case

involved the validity of a legislative enactment extending the
constitutional language granting exemptions from property taxes
to include "insane, idiotic, inform or indigent persons...." The
petitioner in that case asserted that the statute was unconstitutional because it exempted property not included in the constitution.
The Utah Supreme Court agreed.

And, in agreeing, this Court made
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the following statements:
"The meaning and intent manifest from the
constitution are that no property shall
be relieved from the burden of maintaining
the government, except such as was defined
and specified for exemption by that instrument." See 53 P. 98l at page 983
and further, at page 983,
"No one would contend for a moment that the
legislature of this state has power in
express terms to exempt property from taxation, other than that enumerated for exemption in the constitution; and yet in the
enactment of the statute in question the
legislature has undertaken to indirectly
exempt property not so enumerated...
...To prevent the legislature from exempting
property not included within the exemptions
of the constitution, express words were not
necessarytt
...The positive direction that fall property
not exempt under the laws of the United
States or under this constitution shall be
taxed,1 and that the rate of assessmeent and
taxation shall be 'uniform and equal,f so
that Tevery person and corporation shall
pay a tax in proportion to the value of
his, her or its property * with the enumeration
of the property exempted, contains an implication against an exemption of any other property
by the legislature. That direction itself
operates as a restraint upon the legislative
power."

j

The Court thereupon declared that statute to be null
and void.

In doing so, the Court described its function as

regards the judicial review "of legislative enactments stating:
"...we are not unmindful of the fact that
the question whether an enactment of the
legislature is void because of its
repugnancy to the constitution is always
one of much delicacy, and a doubtful case
should seldom, if ever, be decided in the
affirmative. Where, however, the mind is
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convinced of the unconstitutionality of the
laWy the duty which devolves upon the court
to declare it so is Imperative; even where3
as In this case, thestatute appears to be
in cons onaric'e with vj ustice "and humariity.
That the law itself would be beneficent
can be of ho avail in this case3 because
its effect and operation would be to exempt
property against the mandate of the
fundamental law/tT (Emphasis suppTied) page 983
The

Court.

ARMSTRONG case has not been overruled by this

To the contrary, this Court has had occasion to cite

favorably from that case in numerous instances.

Petitioner asserts

that the Court in the instant case should follow the ARMSTRONG
decision and declare Sections 59-2-30 and 59-2-31, Utah Code
Annotated, 1953 5 as amended, to be an unauthorized extension of
the constitutional exemption of property used exclusively for
religious worship and declare the enactments to be unconstitutional.
The consequences of the indiscriminate granting of exemptions
from property taxation was the subject matter of a report prepared
for the Advisory Committee to the Taxation Standing Committee
of the Utah Legislative Council and weru summarized thusly:
. "The problem is that institutional tax exemption has
often been carried beyond its basic purpose and has been abused.
There is clearly a need in Utah to tighten up some of these
exemptions.

Some also feel that tax exemption is an undesirable

method of aiding such institutions.

The Advisory Commission on

Intergovernmental Relationb has summarized the problem thusly:
It seems to have become progressively easier
for almost any organization that engages in
some activity of social or cultural significance
to make the tax-free list—and once on the
list its subsidy tends to be permanent. The
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categories of organizations whose real and
personal property is now exempt either in
all states or a considerable number include:
(1) religious3 including affiliated organizations; (2) educational and cultural; (3) health
and welfare; (4) fraternal and benevolent;
(5) business and professional, such as
chanbers of commerce, bar associations,
medical associations, farmers* organizations,
and labor unions; and (6) veterans7 organizations . Such exemptions may be restricted to
property employed directly in nonprofit
activities, or they may be extended also to
property earning income for these activities.
This, in effect, adds up to a large, concealed
government subsidy for numerous classes of
nonprofit institutions and organizations
ranging down from those whose services clearly
are of a public nature to those whose activities
may be socially desirable but also may be
intermingled with professional and business
interests or even subsidiary to such interests.
Utah is no exception to this trend.

Unfortunately,

there is little information concerning the assessed values or
tax losses pertaining to these exempt properties.
It is strongly urged that the State of Utah adopt the
following recommendation of the Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations relative to these institutional exemptions:
In order that the taxpayers may be kept
informed each State should require the regular
assessment of all such tax exempt property,
compilation of the totals for each type of
exemption by taxing districts, computation
of the percentages of the assessed valuation
thus exempt in each taxing district and publication of the findings. Such publication should
also present summary information on the function,
scope and nature of exempted activities. It is
also recommended that when such information is
available, there be periodic review—say every
five years—of all such exemptions by the State
Tax Commission with the objective of limiting
institutional exemptions to those that are clearly
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affected with a public interest,
ACHIEVING MORE EQUITY AND UNIFORMITY IN
PROPERTY TAX ASSESSMENT IN UTAH; Report for
the Advisory Committee to the Taxation
Standing Committee of the Utah Legislative
Council, November 1966.
This Court should give proper recognition to the
concern of the Legislative Advisory Commission and render a
decision that would curb the trend towards broadening tax
exemptions.
It is, therefore, respectfully submitted that the
decision of the Tax Commission in reliance upon Sections 59-2-30
and 59-2-31, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended, constitute
an unconstitutional extension of the exemptions listed in
Article XIII Section 2 of the Utah Constitution and that the
statutes that give rise to such extensions are unconstitutional.
CONCLUSION
We respectfully submit to this Honorable Court that
the Tax Commission erred, that the only decision supported by
the record in this case was that of the County Board of Equalization, and that the Court direct the Tax Commission to make and enter
its order that the property known as the parsonage for the pastor
of the Good Shepherd Lutheran Church, from the factual situation in
this case, be placed upon the tax rolls of Salt Lake County as
non-exempt property.

And further declare that Sections 59-2-30

and 59-2-31, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended, are unconstitutional.
Respectfully submitted,
R. PAUL VAN DAM, Salt Lake County Attorney
BILL THOMAS PETERS, Special Deputy
County Attorney
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE "
I hereby certify that on the /"^~ day of December,
1975, copies of the foregoing Brief of Petitioner, Salt Lake
County, were served upon Vernon B, Romney, Attorney for State
Tax Commission of Utah, State Capitol Building, Salt Lake City,
Utah, and upon Jerome C. Trelstad, Pastor of Good Shepherd
Lutheran Church, 1376 East 8850 Souths &^ndy, Utah
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